philosopher. What made Hadot unusual in the French intellectual landscape was that he was a philosopher and a historian at the same time: not someone who occupied a middle ground between history and philosophy; not someone who made a conventional call for a dialogue between the two disciplines, but someone who made the seemingly implausible claim that his work was both entirely historical and entirely philosophical. In this article, I would like to propose an analysis and a critical assessment of this claim. years later. In 1966 he married a German-born scholar, Ilsetraut Marten, with whom he co-authored a volume on the commentary of Epictetus by Simplicius. 16 Looking back in his old age at his formative years, Hadot described his departure from the Christian faith as a very slow process, which did not get in the way of his friendships with members of the Catholic clergy. He credited his training as a priest for his familiarity with Latin and Greek literature, and also for his early interest in philosophy, which went beyond We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by another. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.)
In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem). Although every written work is a monologue, the philosophical work is always implicitly a dialogue. The dimension of the possible interlocutor is always present within it. This explains the incoherencies and contradictions which modern historians discover with astonishment in the work of ancient philosophers. In philosophical works such as these, thought cannot be expressed according to the pure, absolute necessity of a systematic order. Rather, it must take into account the level of the interlocutor, and the concrete tempo of the logos in which it is expressed. It is the economy proper to a given logos which conditions its thought content, and it is the logos that constitutes a living system which, in the words of Plato, "ought to have its own body…it must not lack either head or feet; it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other and the whole work (Phaedrus, 264c)."
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When Greek philosophers spoke of logos, they did refer to a coherent discourse, but it was the coherence of a particular discourse at a particular time: the response to one specific question. As Hadot puts it, "each logos is a 'system' but the totality of logoi written by an author does not constitute a system." 50 It is therefore futile to look for the coherence of Aristotle's philosophy as a whole, or to try to divide it up into successive coherent periods. The important point for the purposes of this study is Hadot's insistence that he was not drawn to this notion of philosophy as a way of life for spiritual or ethical reasons. He did not come to the conclusion that ancient philosophy consisted mostly of spiritual exercises because he had a taste for philosophy of an edifying kind. He was drawn to this conclusion for reasons that were both conceptual and exegetical. 72 "There is the history of opinions which is hardly anything but a collection of human errors." Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, "History" article, translated by H.I. Woolf
New York: Knopf, 1924. disparate meanings that there is arguably no point in considering them together. But precisely in this case there is a remarkable continuity: over 2500 years, it is the exact same formula that has been interpreted and reinterpreted. The saying by Heraclitus is one of those "good maxims" that endure successive reinterpretations:
A good aphorism is too hard for the tooth of time, and is not worn away by all the centuries, although it serves as food for every epoch. Hence it is the greatest paradox in literature, the imperishable in the midst of change, the nourishment which always remains highly valued, as salt does, and never becomes stupid like salt.
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This passage from Nietzsche appears in the conclusion of The Veil of Isis, and is less a conclusion or an explanation than the reaffirmation of a puzzle. Some sentences 26 of the Idea of Nature") can easily be misunderstood. Hadot's intent was not to write the history of a unit-idea called "Nature." It was rather to write the history of something much more concrete, namely one sentence, and one image that has often been associated with it: the unveiling of the half-naked goddess Artemis.
In his 1962 article on language games and philosophy, Hadot pointed out that the ancients had a better understanding than we do of what it is to play a language game:
"For them a saying had naturally several meanings, i.e. several possible applications."
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The rhetorical culture of antiquity was an oral culture, in which ready-made topoi were given meaning through a performance that was always singular and tied to a particular place and a particular time. We are less sensitive to these aspects, says Hadot, because philosophy is no longer practiced as "speech. The writing of history, indeed probably like all human activity, must be a coincidentia oppositorum by trying to respond to two equally urgent contradictory requirements. In order to perceive and evaluate historical reality, there must be, on the one hand, a conscious and total self-commitment, and on the other hand, an intended objectivity and impartiality. 
